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EU citizenship: Still a Fundamental Status?
Jo Shaw
 Introduction
Modern history is littered with the corpses of failed federations and busted 
unions. These processes of breakup have had significant and often damaging 
citizenship consequences on many occasions and in many places. Examples 
can be found in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Union, as 
well as in the dismantling of the various European empires and the creation 
of numerous new (and generally arbitrarily defined) states, often as part of 
the decolonisation process.1 Breakup may, of course, eventually be the fate 
of the European Union. Or it may be the opposite – the transmutation of the 
EU into something more like a federal state, through an intensified constitu-
tionalisation process.
This essay explores some of the pressures that are being placed on the 
concept of citizenship of the Union at the present time, highlighting how 
these stem both from exogenous pressures (assuming Brexit can be thought 
to be such) and endogenous forces such as Eurosceptic voting publics and a 
resistance to showing solidarity across the member states in an era of 
austerity.
EU citizenship is paradoxical in nature: formally constitutionalised in the 
Union’s treaty framework, yet dependent upon national citizenship to 
provide the gateway to membership. Its fate remains intimately tied to the 
broader question of the trajectory of European integration, as well as to 
changing perspectives about the character of citizenship as a membership 
status. To highlight that paradoxical character, I offer below some brief 
reflections on the autonomy of national citizenship laws, on the consequences 
of Brexit, and on how choices and actions by individuals and groups may 
1 For an overview of different ‘imperial’ repertoires see Gammerl, B. (2017), 
Subject, citizens, and others: Administering Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British 
and Habsburg Empires, 1867–1918. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books.
This essay was written whilst I was holding a EURIAS Fellowship at the Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies, and the financial support of the EURIAS 
Programme and HCAS is acknowledged with thanks. I am very grateful to Rainer 
Bauböck for comments on a draft.
2impact upon the future of EU citizenship. This discussion is prefaced by an 
initial exploration of the challenges and complexities of EU citizenship and 
of the relationship between citizenship and concepts of integration and 
Europeanisation.
 Challenges and complexities of EU citizenship
The current difficulties faced by the European Union are many and varied. 
They include the pressures caused by the UK’s Brexit vote, the effects of 
increasingly illiberal, populist and anti-constitutionalist regimes in Hungary 
and Poland, the lingering impacts of the financial crisis, among them auster-
ity and challenges to the health of the Eurozone, and the continued aftermath 
of the migration/refugee crisis. These all raise questions about the vitality of 
citizenship of the European Union as a political, socio-economic and consti-
tutional construct of a supranational kind, and many of them are debated in 
different ways by the various multi-author ‘forums’ presented in this book. 
Whether these difficulties do or do not pose an existential threat to the EU 
and thus to EU citizenship lies beyond the scope of this essay. Even so, con-
templating the possibility of disintegration and/or de-Europeanisation is 
central to the task of reinterpreting EU citizenship, 25 years after it formally 
entered into force through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. This is because 
of the centrality and overwhelming importance of the Brexit challenge (both 
for the individuals directly affected and also for the historical trajectory of 
the European Union), to which we will return later in this short reflection on 
some of the ‘constitutional’ characteristics of EU citizenship.
It is important to remark, however, that at the current stage of the 
European integration, no person deprived of their EU citizenship through 
dissolution of the Union or departure of a member state would normally be 
at risk of losing their national citizenship and their anchor within the system 
of states, their ‘right to have rights’.2 Although the functions and forms of 
citizenship are dispersed across the multi-level structure of the EU polity 
and EU citizenship is established constitutionally in Article 9 TEU and 
Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, at the present time states retain a monopoly over 
determining who their citizens are, and would continue to do so were the EU 
to dissolve in the future.
At whatever point we choose to ‘stop time’ and write a historical reinter-
pretation of the EU’s experiment with a form of supranational citizenship, it 
will always be a complex and contested story. It is important to resist the 
2 Arendt, H. (1967), The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 296.
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3temptation to take a ‘frozen in time’ approach to explicating this story. On 
the contrary, we should remind ourselves, by reference to classic texts such 
as that of TH Marshall,3 that the location of citizenship forms and functions 
has always been a mobile process, morphing at different points in history 
between the local (e.g. the city), the regional, the national and the suprana-
tional. In fact, we can use the concept of citizenship across all of these lev-
els, wherever there are institutions of political authority.
The idea of the link between a community of citizens and a political 
authority was not really the starting point for EU citizenship. The European 
Union began its journey towards recognising a uniform legal status for indi-
viduals at the supranational level not by acknowledging and supporting the 
political agency of individuals as citizens, but by giving them rights and 
freedoms. Specifically, it was through the civil and socio-economic rights 
and freedoms that are inherent in the idea of a single market that a notion of 
the individual having a stake in the integration project originally emerged. 
Much of the power of these rights and freedoms to effect a transformation of 
individual rights lay in the recognition of individuals as autonomous legal 
actors within the European legal order by the European Court of Justice 
(CJEU). This was an important conclusion, which the Court derived from a 
purposive reading of the founding treaties. In addition, some further contri-
butions towards the development of the rights of EU market actors were also 
made by the EU legislature, especially when it came to giving effect to the 
principles of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and mutual rec-
ognition. Most of this work predated the formal establishment of the legal 
concept of the Union citizen.
Only later was a modest edifice of political rights constructed (once the 
Treaty of Maastricht had entered into force and the constitutional provisions 
we recognise today had been introduced) and it was even later still that we 
have come to see a closer legal and constitutional intertwining of the legal 
statuses of EU citizenship and national citizenship, again largely as a result 
of the interventions of the CJEU. We will come back to this dimension of 
EU citizenship shortly. What has been most noticeable about this process 
has been that the idea of the ‘civil’ (a ‘Europe of law’) has underpinned and 
accompanied every stage of the putative building of supranational 
 citizenship. This looks, at first blush, like a wholly top-down construction of 
3 Marshall, T.H. (1950), Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
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4citizenship that does little to illuminate the broader political quest to identify 
‘who are the Europeans?’.4
Another way of highlighting the idiosyncracies of EU citizenship involves 
looking at the classic elements commonly associated with modelling citizen-
ship as a form of full membership (e.g. status, rights, identity, duties). It is 
only in the sphere of rights that EU citizenship seems well developed. As to 
the issue of identity, the sense of ‘Europeanness’ that exists across the col-
lectivity of citizens is relatively thin in nature, again focused on rights, and it 
is hardly comparable with the form of societal glue that gives community 
cohesion to the national (and subnational) polities on which the EU is built.5 
Moreover, the status itself remains derivative from national citizenship – 
only citizens of the member states are citizens of the Union.
And yet despite all of this negativity, there is also a more optimistic read-
ing that suggests that EU citizenship could be evolving into a different sort of 
concept than was perhaps anticipated when the member states originally set 
up the legal framework, mainly as an additional bonus for market partici-
pants. Scholars laud EU citizenship as an emerging postnational concept that 
escapes ‘narrow’ nationalist constraints of state-based citizenship regimes.6 
The comparison with other forms of supranational citizenship, such as 
Commonwealth citizenship, makes EU citizenship look like a relative suc-
cess story. Commonwealth citizenship largely withered on the vine because 
of the evisceration of most of the rights attached to it (e.g. right of abode in 
the UK), or the non-adoption of the concept by Commonwealth countries. By 
contrast, we have a rich, if sometimes contradictory, case law of the Court of 
Justice on the status of EU citizens resident in other member states that 
ensures that in many spheres of life EU citizens have to be recognised as 
holding rights under the precise same conditions as nationals of the host state.
Furthermore, there is now a discussion, as evidenced by section 3 of this 
book on citizenship duties and social solidarity, as to whether this dimension 
of EU citizenship should be filled out in due course, in ways that would 
make EU citizenship relevant not only to mobile citizens, but also to those 
4 See generally Shaw, J. (2011), ‘Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at the 
interface of integration and constitutionalism’, in P. Craig & G. de Búrca 
(eds,), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd Edition, 575–609. Oxford: OUP.
5 Bellamy, R. (2008), ‘Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights and 
participation within the EU’, Citizenship Studies 12 (6): 597–611.
6 Kostakopoulou, D. (2018), ‘Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post-Brexit 
and the European Union’s Duty to Protect EU Citizens’, JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12683.
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5who remain in their member state of origin. At that point, EU citizenship 
could be said to be moving much closer to being a recognisable variant, at 
the supranational level, of the classic national model of membership as a 
status and as a reference point around which citizens can cohere, even if it 
is not (yet) recognised in international law as a form of ‘nationality’. In 
order to achieve this transformation it would, however, have to be no longer 
just a ‘citizenship of mobiles’. Only then could it also become the vehicle 
for a wider sense of citizen mobilisation.
 Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation in EU citizenship
It will already be evident that many of the concepts I have tossed around in 
these short paragraphs are contested and hardly have stable meanings. This 
complicates considerably the task of reinterpreting EU citizenship, whether 
constitutionally or politically. The concept of EU citizenship needs to be 
understood in the context of both citizenship theory and integration theory. 
Our interpretation of the distinctive features of EU citizenship requires a 
combination of the analytical frames offered by both citizenship studies and 
European Union studies. It is only by this means that we can construct a 
historically and contextually sensitive interpretation of this evolving and 
contested concept. To put it another way, EU citizenship is a product not 
only of a hesitant process of polity-building beyond the state but also of a 
move away from a predominantly state-centred conception of citizenship. It 
relies equally on rethinking ideas about ‘integration’ and on rethinking citi-
zenship as a relational concept and not a fixed structure,7 combining both 
plural and multi-level institutional elements and also the bottom-up prac-
tices of citizens as legal and political actors in a non-state context. Rethinking 
integration in turn requires acknowledgement that the story of the EU is not 
one of linear progress towards ‘an ever closer union’, even though it is quite 
common still for EU citizenship to be lauded as somehow embodying this 
historic mission. The better view, however, is to recognise that there is no 
unidirectional process of Europeanisation in which the elements and con-
straints generated by EU citizenship are simply downloaded onto national 
citizenship regimes, with alterations to policies and institutions made 
accordingly.8 In fact, uncovering and analysing the narrative of EU citizen-
7 See Wiesner, C. et al. (2018), ‘Introduction: Shaping Citizenship as a Political 
Concept’, in C. Wiesner et al. (eds.), Shaping Citizenship, 1–17 (10). 
New York: Routledge.
8 For an extended analysis in these terms see Thym, D. (ed.) (2017), Questioning 
EU citizenship. Judges and the limits of free movement and solidarity in the 
EU. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
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6ship reveals that there is no such story of linear progress, but rather a set of 
complex and often countervailing narratives of Europeanisation and de- 
Europeanisation, which together combine to make up the full picture.
For the purposes of this essay, we need to think of Europeanisation as 
more than just the principle that membership of the EU means that member 
states must comply with EU law and implement legislative measures and 
new administrative requirements introduced by the EU legislature. It is also 
a two-way track in which elements of national choice and institutional 
‘style’ find their way into EU-wide measures and approaches to policy-
making as well as into its institutional forms, not least through the partici-
pation of member states in the legislative process. This is a broader and 
more sociological concept of Europeanisation than is commonly deployed 
in political science, and it incorporates also aspects of legal culture as well 
as formal compliance with EU law. A similar approach is also useful when 
analysing counter moves of de-Europeanisation. At the collective level, 
there is the trend towards intergovernmental approaches to become once 
again the norm, with a resurgence of control by the member states vis-à-vis 
the Commission or the Court of Justice. At the level of member states it 
encompasses not just deviations in compliance, but equally the alienation 
of (some) member states from the core requirements or principles of inte-
gration, through practices such as flexibility and differentiated integration. 
Finally, it includes also the hitherto unique phenomenon of Brexit, where a 
member state is negotiating a formal exit from the EU, but also, for the 
future, a revised relationship perhaps akin to association or membership of 
the EEA via a ‘Norway’ or EFTA model, or perhaps much looser in charac-
ter. Under the former model, some of the underpinning principles of EU 
citizenship, such as free movement, may continue to apply, which is one 
reason why it is presently very controversial in the UK as a possible post-
Brexit scenario.
We can now take a closer look at some of the criss-crossing pathways of 
Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation. What might be seen as opposing 
trends of ‘integration’ and ‘disintegration’ are in fact occurring simultane-
ously. First we examine the extent and character of the apparently increasing 
EU law constraints upon the citizenship laws of member states. This raises 
the question of how autonomous national citizenship laws may be in the 
future. Second, we explore some of the main ‘citizenship consequences’ of 
the Brexit vote and the anticipated departure of the United Kingdom from 
the EU. The two issues are interrelated in many ways, and not just through 
a common preoccupation with the question of the autonomy of different 
levels within the EU’s current multilevel citizenship regime. Furthermore, 
J. Shaw
7the reflections below will help to show, amongst other insights, that EU citi-
zenship is not just a matter of institutional choices but also, increasingly, of 
choices made and routes followed by individuals and groups. It has both a 
top-down and a bottom-up dimension.
 How far does EU citizenship constrain member state 
sovereignty in matters of nationality law?
The EU has been accused of being ‘over-constitutionalised’.9 That is, that 
too much in terms of substance and too many constraints on national sover-
eignty have been packed into its founding treaties, and handed over for 
authoritative interpretation and application to the CJEU. This has the effect 
of over-emphasising the role of the judiciary, both at the supranational and 
the national level (as the starting point for most pathways to the Court of 
Justice, especially for individual litigants, lies in the national courts, not the 
EU courts). Some have argued that there is no obvious legitimating factor 
justifying this function. It just looks like overpowerful and overweaning 
judges, undermining political constitutionalism.10 This unnecessarily sub-
verts the role of elected institutions and thus of ‘the people’ who elect those 
institutions. Equally, EU legislative measures are often – of necessity – 
somewhat broad and protean in their drafting, and require frequent judicial 
reinterpretation even once they have been transposed into the national legal 
orders. They are also very difficult to amend because of multiple veto points 
within the system.
The field of EU citizenship is arguably ripe for such an interpretation. EU 
citizenship, established in Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, has operated as a back-
stop in cases where the most important secondary legislation, notably the 
so-called citizens’ rights or free movement directive,11 does not apply. CJEU 
case law, on issues such as the rights of third country national family 
 members of mobile EU citizens, has proved challenging for national author-
ities to accept and implement.
Exploring the well-known point that fears about loss of national sover-
eignty over immigration and about CJEU judicial power have been impor-
tant factors in the Brexit vote, Susanne Schmidt has shown in some detail 
how this process has worked in the case of free movement, leaving little 
9 Grimm, D. (2015), ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The 
European Case’, European Law Journal 21 (4): 460–473.
10 See Bellamy, R. (2007), Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of 
the Constitutionality of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11 Directive 2004/38/EC [2004] OJ L158/77.
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8obvious leeway for national authorities to protect either the interests of the 
state or societal cohesion.12 Of course, that sense of an infringement of sov-
ereignty has largely emerged out of a narrow and restrictive interpretation of 
the idea of free movement as a unilateral track involving non-UK citizens 
(generally called ‘EU migrants’, not ‘EU citizens’) moving towards the UK, 
which has dominated in the Europhobic popular media. The choice to name 
certain social actions in terms of ‘immigration’ rather than ‘co-citizenship’ 
will always have consequences. Its impact should not be underestimated. It 
contributed to a strong perception in the UK – against the backdrop of an 
increasingly rigid immigration policy backed up by harsh enforcement 
actions against those falling foul of the law – that EU free movers are lucky, 
undeservedly lucky, migrants, doing better in the UK than UK citizens 
themselves, not least because the family reunion rules they benefit from are 
more generous than those applicable to UK citizens under UK law. On that 
count, they are not seen as sharing a status with UK citizens – i.e. that of EU 
citizen. And the sense that this status involves a twin track of mobility in 
both directions as well as the possibility to take common political action, 
e.g. in relation to European Parliament elections, is lost entirely.
It could be said that national reactions (and the UK is hardly alone in 
this) to the constitutionalising case law in the sphere of ‘citizenship’, espe-
cially in relation to the status and rights of mobile EU citizens and their 
families (including third country nationals) resident in other member states, 
has lain behind the retrenchment of that same case law in recent years. 
Judges are not immune from political pressures. They read newspapers. The 
newest case law has become more respectful of the welfare sovereignty of 
the member states, and has stated clear limits to the dictum that the Court 
once pronounced, that there should be a ‘certain degree of solidarity’ 
amongst the member states when it comes to the question of which set of 
taxpayers should support which types of economically inactive, or less 
active, citizens. But while the CJEU has been busy in recent years stating 
that free movement is not free from limits, this move may have come too 
late for the UK.
It is therefore perhaps surprising that we can see constitutional con-
straints on member state sovereignty continuing to accrete in relation to 
some of the choices that those states can make as regards the application of 
their domestic citizenship laws and its consequences, especially in the 
12 Schmidt, S. (2017), ‘Extending Citizenship Rights and Losing it All: Brexit 
and the Perils of “Over-Constitutionalisation”, in Thym, D. above n.8, at 
17–36.
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9sphere of immigration and family reunion. It is well established that it is a 
matter for the member states to decide who may acquire their citizenship, 
thus making the member states the gatekeepers of access to EU citizenship, 
although from early on the CJEU has made it clear that member states may 
not refuse to recognise an ‘EU citizenship’. In Micheletti,13 for example, 
Spain could not choose to treat a dual Italian/Argentinian national as simply 
Argentinian for the purposes of access to the territory or to benefits associ-
ated with presence on the territory. This is an early example of the CJEU 
requiring such national competences around nationality and the recognition 
of nationality to be exercised, in situations covered by European Union law, 
in a manner that has due regard to the requirements of EU law.
The ‘situations covered by EU law’ have included the type of scenario 
that arose in the case of Rottmann,14 where the applicant had moved from 
Austria to Germany, and had obtained German citizenship by fraud, failing 
to inform the authorities that he was the subject of possible criminal pro-
ceedings in Austria. The reversal of the naturalisation decision by the state 
authorities in the case of Rottmann fell within the scope of EU law because 
of that mobility, and thus Germany had to apply its withdrawal rules in a 
manner that had regard to the impact of the withdrawal on Rottmann’s status 
as an EU citizen and the loss of rights that would flow from this. By becom-
ing German, Rottmann had lost his Austrian citizenship by operation of law. 
Thus depriving him of German citizenship left him, at least for the time 
being, stateless. The CJEU made it clear that measures withdrawing citizen-
ship and depriving a person of their EU citizenship needed to be capable of 
judicial review at the national level and they needed to be proportionate, in 
order to comply with the requirements of EU law. In drawing this conclu-
sion, the Court referenced the early case of Grzelczyk where it stated that 
citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals 
of the member states.15 In general, though, the Court indicated that with-
drawal of citizenship on grounds of fraud during the process of  naturalisation 
expresses a legitimate state interest. It declined to rule on the question of 
what, if any, measures Austria should take if Rottmann sought to recover his 
original nationality.
Rottmann is the only case thus far where a CJEU ruling has intruded 
directly into the field of citizenship law, although pending before the Court 
is the Tjebbes case on the effects of Dutch rules which deprive persons, by 
13 Case C-369/90 ECLI:EU:C:1992:295.
14 Case C-135/08 ECLI:EU:C:2010:104.
15 Case C-184/99 ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para. 31.
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operation of law, of their Dutch citizenship on the grounds of habitual resi-
dence outside the EU for more than 10 years, where they have another 
nationality (whether acquired afterwards or before).16 It will be interesting 
to see whether the CJEU recognises habitual residence abroad as a legiti-
mate state interest justifying withdrawal of citizenship and thus loss of EU 
citizenship, especially since such a withdrawal of citizenship by operation 
of law by definition deprives individuals, including children, of the possibil-
ity of individual (judicial) review of their cases. This case is especially inter-
esting because after Brexit the UK is set to become be a third country 
vis-à-vis the EU. Thus EU citizenship will presumably not offer the counter-
balance to the lack of recognition of dual nationality under Netherlands law, 
which currently reduces the options available to migrant Dutch citizens.
This case should be seen, however, alongside interesting political devel-
opments. After the Brexit vote, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands 
appeared to double down on his country’s resistance to dual citizenship, 
despite pressure from Dutch citizens resident in the UK.17 However, perhaps 
as a harbinger of further changes to come in other member states in order to 
be responsive to the citizenship consequences of Brexit, the new coalition 
agreement reached in October 2017 as the basis for the creation of the new 
government adopted a more liberal approach to dual citizenship. This had 
been the existing party policy of just one of the four coalition partners (the 
D66 Liberal Democrats party). It offers the prospect of legal reform in order 
to provide assurances to Dutch citizens resident in the UK that they will be 
able to keep their Netherlands citizenship after naturalising in the UK.18
16 Case C-221/17. For a brief commentary see de Haart, B. and Mantu, S. (2017), 
‘Loss of Dutch nationality ex lege: EU law, gender and multiple nationality’, 
GlobalCIT blog, http://globalcit.eu/
loss-of-dutch-nationality-ex-lege-eu-law-gender-and-multiple-nationality/.
17 ‘Dutch nationals taking UK citizenship “will lose Netherlands passports”’, The 
Guardian, 17 July 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2017/jul/17/dutch-nationals-brexit-uk-citizenship-lose-netherlands-pass-
ports-mark-rutte; for details on loss of citizenship by acquisition of foreign 
citizenship, see GlobalCIT Citizenship Modes of Loss database, http://
globalcit.eu/loss-of-citizenship/.
18 See ‘Brexit: Dutch nationals living in Britain will be allowed dual citizenship’, 
The Guardian, 10 October 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/oct/10/dutch-nationals-living-britain-allowed-dual-citizenship-
brexit. The details of how this might work are not as yet known. Details of the 
earlier D66 proposal, which cited research showing that the Netherlands is 
now an outlier in the matter of dual citizenship in Europe can be found here: 
http://fasos.maastrichtuniversity.nl/weekly/
macimide-dataset-cited-in-proposed-amendment-of-dutch-citizenship-law/.
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Finally, the mantra of EU citizenship’s fundamental importance for 
nationals of the member states has also been invoked in order to justify 
restrictions on national rules on the assignation or recognition of names,19 in 
the context of civil status laws,20 and certain national rules restricting the 
right to vote in European Parliament elections.21 These cases buttress the 
argument that EU citizenship is emerging as an autonomous constitutional 
status for nationals of the member states.
In a small number of instances, the CJEU has defended a territorial prin-
ciple in relation to the enjoyment of EU citizenship, finding in a series of 
cases from Ruiz Zambrano22 onwards that where a minor EU citizen would 
be forced to leave the territory of the Union if one or more of his or her third 
country national parents with direct caring responsibilities were to be 
deported from a member state (thus depriving the EU citizen of the enjoy-
ment of his or her citizenship rights), then the parent(s) will enjoy derived 
rights of residence stemming from Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. Here, the con-
stitutional effects of EU law are largely felt in the sphere of national immi-
gration law, restricting decision-making in respect of third country nationals 
by reference to the status of the EU citizen dependent child.23 The possibility 
of protection for third country nationals stems in this case from the effects 
of citizenship laws conferring nationality at birth. The principle can apply 
even if only one of the parents is a third country national. The key question 
is whether the EU citizen child has a primary relationship of care with the 
parent at threat of losing their residence.
Acquisition of a new EU nationality after birth (e.g. through naturalisa-
tion) has also become an issue, provided that the person naturalising still 
retains her or his original (EU) nationality. The CJEU concluded in the 2017 
Lounes case24 that an EU citizen who has made use of her free movement 
rights and naturalises on the basis of residence and integration within the 
19 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello ECLI:EU:C:2003:539.
20 See Pataut, E. (2016), ‘A Family Status for the European Citizen?’, in Azoulai, 
L. et al. (eds.), Constructing the Person in EU Law Rights, Roles, Identities, 
311–322. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
21 Case C-650/13 Delvigne ECLI:EU:C:2015:648.
22 Case C-34/09 ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
23 For a recent analysis, see Peers, S. (2017), ‘Think of the children: the ECJ 
clarifies the status of non-EU parents of EU citizen children living in their own 
Member State’, EU Law Analysis Blog, 10 May 2017, available at http://
eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/05/think-of-children-ecj-clarifies-status.
html.
24 Case C-165/16 ECLI:EU:C:2017:862.
EU citizenship: Still a Fundamental Status?
12
host member state will no longer benefit from Directive 2004/38 (and thus 
no longer has the family reunion rights conferred under the Directive on 
mobile EU citizens). However, she will benefit still from her status as an EU 
citizen under Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. This means that the host state must 
grant her rights to family reunion that are no more restrictive than those laid 
down in the Directive. What makes this controversial is that the EU citizen 
in these circumstances benefits from EU law measures on family reunion 
that are notably less restrictive than the national rules applicable in most 
member states for citizens.25
The lack of symmetry in the dual nationality rules applied by the member 
states across the EU means that this approach, while superficially attractive in 
terms of special protection of the interests of those who go so far as to natu-
ralise in the host state, has an unhelpful aura of arbitrariness about its scope of 
application. For example, it would seem that if the Lounes case, involving a 
Spanish woman acquiring UK citizenship and keeping her Spanish citizenship, 
and benefiting from family reunion with her Algerian partner, were reversed, 
the position would not be the same. Suppose that a British woman resident in 
Spain were to acquire Spanish citizenship by naturalisation. The theoretically 
stricter requirements in relation to dual citizenship in Spain would mean that 
she would not be able to continue benefiting from her UK citizenship under 
Articles 20 and 21 TFEU because, at least as far as the Spanish authorities 
would be concerned, she would have renounced that nationality.
 Can EU citizenship be retained after Brexit?
The developments in relation to the constitutional constraints generated by 
EU citizenship may prove to be of central importance when it comes to fig-
uring out the effects of Brexit on EU citizenship (and indeed of EU citizen-
ship on Brexit). The orthodox international law-based position would be as 
follows: once the UK leaves the EU, the Treaties and the various rights and 
obligations applicable under them no longer apply. Absent a consensual 
arrangement under Article 50 TEU in the exit negotiations, the treatment of 
EU27 citizens resident in the UK and UK citizens resident in the EU27 
reverts to being a matter for national immigration law subject only to certain 
international human rights obligations. Each member of these two groups 
has to seek stable legal residence from their host state. At most, those in this 
situation could benefit from residual protection of their family life interests 
25 See Peers, S. (2017), ‘Dual citizens and EU citizenship: clarification from the 
ECJ’, EU Law Analysis Blog, 15 November 2017, available at http://eulawa-
nalysis.blogspot.com/2017/11/dual-citizens-and-eu-citizenship.html.
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under the European Convention on Human Rights26 or perhaps – where EU 
immigration law applies in the EU27 – protection under Directive 2003/109, 
which harmonises rights of long term resident third country nationals.27 It is 
unsurprising that the EU has made the situation of these groups of EU citi-
zens, who have previously relied upon their free movement rights, a priority 
within the Article 50 negotiations, and it can broadly be assumed that if 
there is an Article 50 withdrawal agreement then most of their rights will be 
protected under its provisions. This will not be just like benefiting from EU 
citizenship, but such a legal measure will surely, wherever it applies, insti-
tute a new category of relatively privileged alien, although there are bound 
to be plenty of cases of uncertainty that will generate litigation that will end 
up before the CJEU, or some specially constituted judicial institution.
This outcome marks the resurgence of the fundamentals of national 
immigration law over the postnational promise of EU citizenship, and the 
same could be said of the alternative, which is that the former beneficiaries 
of EU citizenship rights should seek naturalisation in the host state. 
According to Dora Kostakopoulou, this would ‘lead to the absorption of the 
status of EU citizenship by national citizenship.’28 In any event, as is well 
known, naturalisation will not provide the answer in all cases, because of 
uneven member state policies on dual citizenship, not to mention other 
issues such as naturalisation tests and costs. That has not stopped many UK 
citizens (whether static or mobile) from exploring how they might access a 
member state nationality that would preserve their EU citizenship rights, or 
indeed many EU27 citizens from naturalising in the UK. Gareth Davies has 
argued that Lounes was decided by the CJEU with one eye on Brexit, but 
he is hardly complimentary about the nature of the CJEU’s reasoning.29 But 
exploration of citizenship options represents just one of the many ways in 
which individuals are reacting to the difficult choices that Brexit is forcing 
on them.
Other pathways followed by those objecting on either personal or political 
grounds to the UK leaving the EU (and the circumstances in which it is doing 
26 Kuric and Others v Slovenia, No 26828/06, [2013] 56 EHRR 20.
27 Directive 2003/109 on the status of third country nationals who are long term 
residents OJ 2003 L16/44.
28 See Kostakopoulou above n.6, 7.
29 Davies, G. (2018), ‘The State of Play on Citizens’ Rights and Brexit’, 
European Law Blog, 6 February 2018, http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/02/06/
the-state-of-play-on-citizens-rights-and-brexit/ and Davies, G. (2018), ‘Lounes, 
Naturalisation and Brexit’, European Law Blog, 5 March 2018, available at 
http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/03/05/lounes-naturalisation-and-brexit/.
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so) include increased political activism, via well-established actors such as the 
European Citizens’ Action Service, newly formed NGOs such the 3Million 
(EU27 in UK) and British in Europe, or repurposed pro-EU NGOs such as 
New Europeans or European Alternatives which have been given a new impe-
tus by the urgency of the issues raised by Brexit. Brexit has given rise to 
unprecedented civic mobilisation around demands for the protection of 
acquired rights, including several European Citizens’ Initiatives registered by 
the European Commission.30 Some have raised the possibility of EU citizen-
ship becoming a freestanding status that can be acceded to other than through 
the nationality of the member states, with UK citizens being offered the possi-
bility of ‘associate citizenship’,31 but at present such proposals remain utopian 
(and probably undesirable) rather than practical in character. All of these initia-
tives unfortunately remind us what a divisive issue Brexit is and will remain 
especially, but not only, in the UK. Part of the reason for the Brexit vote was 
precisely that EU citizenship was not recognised as a social fact by the majority 
of voters. Yet even if EU citizenship could be said to be a prime example of 
conceptual change occurring before political, institutional and social reality 
changes, for a group of directly affected persons EU citizenship very definitely 
is an established social fact, as well as a source of legal rights. Once estab-
lished, can the rights of EU citizenship simply be taken away by state fiat?
There have been several attempts to bring this issue before the CJEU, to 
see whether it may be inclined to engage in judicial activism in order to 
protect the status of EU citizenship. In a major victory for those who have 
been seeking to use law and litigation in the battle for EU citizenship rights,32 
a Dutch first instance court faced with such a claim by UK citizens resident 
in the Netherlands initially decided in February 2018 to make a reference to 
the CJEU under Article 267 to seek authoritative answers to questions it saw 
as essential to deciding the case before it. It wanted to know whether 
30 See for example http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/open/
details/2017/000005 and http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initia-
tives/open/details/2017/000003. For reflection see Garner, O. (2017), ‘The 
European Citizens’ Initiative on a European Free Movement Mechanism’, 
European Law Blog, 23 February 2017, available at http://europeanlawblog.
eu/2017/02/23/
the-european-citizens-initiative-on-a-european-free-movement-mechanism-a-
new-hope-or-a-false-start-for-uk-nationals-after-brexit/.
31 See the discussion in Schrauwen, A, (2017), ‘(Not) Losing out from Brexit’, 
Europe and the World: A Law Review 1 (1): 1–18.
32 Maugham, J. (2018), ‘Why I helped bring the Dutch case over Britons’ EU 
rights’, The Guardian, 18 January 2018, available at https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2018/jan/18/
dutch-case-britons-eu-rights-brexit-uk-citizens.
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withdrawal of the UK from the EU automatically leads to the loss of the EU 
citizenship of UK nationals and the elimination of the rights and freedoms 
deriving from EU citizenship, and if it does not what conditions should then 
be imposed. The decision to make a reference has now been appealed to the 
superior Dutch courts, but if the case does reach the CJEU it may be expe-
dited for rapid resolution given the obvious urgency of the situation.
The issue being tested here is not the UK’s future compliance with EU 
citizenship rights, but rather that of another member state, where a group of 
concerned UK citizens are resident. This is, of course, a hugely political 
question for the CJEU to be faced with, and it is likely to find ways to dodge 
the bullet because of the negative impact such a judgment could have upon 
its credibility. The Dutch district court was faced with the argument, put 
forward by the defendants in the case (the Netherlands and the city of 
Amsterdam) that the question was merely a political issue not a legal ques-
tion, and that the dispute – at this stage – was purely fictional. The judge 
concluded, however, that there was a real and present threat of harm flowing 
from the possibility of Brexit, including UK withdrawal without an agree-
ment under Article 50 TEU. The CJEU may, to the contrary, conclude that 
this is – at this stage – a purely hypothetical dispute and so the request for 
certain questions to be answered under the reference procedure is inadmis-
sible. Even if the reference is accepted as admissible, there are formidable 
obstacles to making the case that EU citizenship somehow maintains a life 
after Brexit,33 even though applicants see themselves as relying upon the 
logical consequences of the line of case law leading up to and beyond Ruiz 
Zambrano, which has been defended extra-judicially by no less a personage 
than the President of the CJEU himself.34 Perhaps the best that could be 
hoped for in terms of legal outcome for the applicants will not be the asser-
tion that EU citizenship somehow continues as a status, but rather the sort of 
‘freezing’ of basic rights articulated for the very different case of Slovenia 
after the administrative ‘erasure’ of certain non-citizens following indepen-
dence in 1992 and adjudicated in the Kuric case before the European Court 
of Human Rights.35 In fact, we do not really need the CJEU to tell us that 
33 McCrea, R. (2018), ‘Brexit EU Citizenship Rights of UK Nationals and the 
Court of Justice’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 8 February 2018, available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/02/08/
ronan-mccrea-brexit-eu-citizenship-rights-of-uk-nationals-and-the-court-of-
justice/.
34 Lenaerts, K. (2015), ‘EU citizenship and the European Court of Justice’s 
‘stone-by-stone’ approach’, International Comparative Jurisprudence 1(1): 
1–10.
35 See above n.26.
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these are the human rights obligations of the member states in the absence 
of a withdrawal agreement on the rights of EU citizens.
And yet we are led ineluctably back to the question of how far the consti-
tutionalising effects of EU citizenship already go, and how much further they 
might stretch in the future. The referring judge in the Dutch case discussed 
above relied in his brief judgment on Rottmann and Lounes, building his 
reflections on the back of the classic dictum – no longer so frequently invoked 
by the Court of Justice and notably missing from the reasoning in Lounes – 
that EU citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of the nationals of 
the member states.36 On that analysis, EU citizenship can be seen as an inde-
pendent source of rights for citizens, and once granted cannot be taken away 
unless the measures adopted would pass the proportionality test. One might 
agree with Davies37 that with Rottmann and now Lounes the CJEU has already 
travelled most of the way down the road towards the conclusion that member 
states cannot just deprive citizens of rights once granted. However, it will 
doubtless come under heavy pressure to accept that the implementation of the 
consequences of a referendum held in the UK represents a legitimate and 
powerful state interest that outweighs the interests of individuals, if it comes 
to the question of implementing a  proportionality test. Yet the Dutch judge has 
something to say about this matter too, embellishing the argument with some 
important – if controversial – democratic principles:
[5.22] the essence of a democratic constitutional state is that the rights and interests of 
minorities are protected as much as possible. The same applies to the functioning of the EU 
as a whole which forms a democratic community of (member) states governed by the rule 
of law.
What then, of the mythical ‘people’ so often invoked by the current UK 
government to justify pursuing a ‘Brexit means Brexit’ policy on the coat 
tails of a vote in which little more than 35 per cent of the overall registered 
voting population stated that the UK should ‘leave the European Union’ 
without being any more precise about how or with what consequences?38 
How can democracy be judged in such a contest between minorities and 
36 See https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RB
AMS:2018:605. For an unofficial summary of key sections of the judgment, 
see https://waitingfortax.
com/2018/02/07/a-summary-in-english-of-the-decision-of-the-district-court-in-
amsterdsm/.
37 See above n.29.
38 What if everyone had voted in the EU referendum?’, UK and EU Blog, 28 July 
2016, available at http://ukandeu.ac.uk/
what-if-everyone-had-voted-in-the-eu-referendum/
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majorities, and what might be the legitimate role of a Dutch court to set in 
train a series of events that might lead to a legally legitimate decision of the 
UK electorate being constrained in its effects?
The stage could be set, therefore, for a constitutional confrontation of the 
highest order before the CJEU, where the limits of the CJEU’s capacity for 
judicial activism (or, as some might have it, legitimate protection of consti-
tutional constraints on oppressive state action) will be tested. EU citizenship 
may remain very different to national citizenship, but it is possible that it has 
already acquired enough of its own distinctive ‘sticky’ qualities that it will 
come to haunt the Brexit negotiations in unexpected ways.
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